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Bailey: Constitutional Law - Freedom of Expression and the Constitutional
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Freedom of Expression and the Constitutional Privilege to Defame. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556
(Wyo. 1976).

On July 21, 1972, the Mayor of Cheyenne participated in
an "open mike"1 radio talk program, "Cheyenne Today",
and discussed a proposed project to improve land east of
Cheyenne. The Mayor mentioned that Bob Adams, former
state legislator and Insurance Commissioner, was associated
with the project. Questions were invited from the listening
audience. An unidentified caller phoned in and declared that
Adams had been discharged as Insurance Commissioner for
dishonesty.2 Adams sought recovery for defamation, alleging
careless and negligent conduct of Frontier Broadcasting in
failing to control and monitor its facilities during the program by use of a tape delay broadcast system. The district
court found Adams to be a public figure within the meaning
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' Finding no evidence of
malice on the part of Frontier in broadcasting the defamatory remark, the court granted Frontier's motion for summary judgment. On appeal the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that the commitment to uninhibited and wide-open public debate must, on balance, outweigh a public figure's right
to be free from defamatory remarks. The Court also held
that failure to use an electronic tape delay system in connection with an open mike talk show on which a public figure
is defamed does not constitute reckless disregard for the
truth.4
DEFAMATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE

Man's right to be free from defamatory remarks has
long been a principle of law which "reflects no more than our
Copyright@ 1977 by the University of Wyoming

1. Live radio talk show in which members of the listening public are invited
to join in the discussion.
2. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Adams].
3. 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). The Court actually applied he United States
Supreme Court's expansion of the Times doctrine to include public figures,
those people who voluntarily place themselves in public controversy, or
those whose fame is so pervasive as to make them public figures. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4. Adams, supra note 2.
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basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being."5 Defamation is an invasion of reputation and
good name by statements which tend to hold a person up to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned or
avoided.'
Injury to reputation can be as real and damaging as
any physical injury. The law, therefore, gives redress for
wrongful invasions of this sort in order to prevent recourse
to self-help remedies.7 The legitimate state interest underlying the law of defamation is the need to compensate individuals for harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood.'
This interest cannot be viewed in isolation. The United
States Constitution guarantees to each individual freedom of
expression.' There is a legitimate state interest in the free
flow of information and public discussion. On the one hand,
each person is free to express himself, but on the other, liable
if the wrong thing is said. The Supreme Court has accommodated these potentially conflicting interests with respect
to private individuals by declaring that defamatory words
belong to that category of utterances which "are of no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."'" Prevention and punishment of
defamation of private individuals has never been thought to
raise any constitutional problems."
In cases involving defamation of public figures or officials, when matters of public concern are in controversy,
society's interest in free and open debate has seemed to outweigh the right to be free from defamatory falsehood. When
public issues are involved, the right of the public to have
access to social and political ideas is thought to be crucial"
5. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
6. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 111, at 739 (4th ed. 1971).
7. Id.
8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, at 323.
9. U.S. CONSTITUTION amend. I; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 20.
10. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
11. Id.
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 270.
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to the making of informed decisions on such issues. Defamation of public figure has, therefore, been judged by a different standard than that applying to private individuals because public figures commonly inject themselves into public
controversy voluntarily and have broader avenues of reply
to false accusations.'
Founded on the common law privilege of fair comment,' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan defined constitutional privilege and enunciated standards by which defamation of
public officials could be judged. Finding libelous statements
published about the Police Commissioner of Montgomery,
Alabama, to be constitutionally protected, the United States
Supreme Court held:
The Constitutional guarantees require, we
think, a federal rule that prohibites a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with "actual malice"that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'"
Decisions subsequent to New York Times have refined
the rule by including public figures, 6 as well as public officials, within the ambit of protection, and defining reckless
disregard for truth as acting with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity."
Adams v. FrontierBroadcasting Co.: APPLICATION
New York Times RULE

OF THE

The Wyoming Supreme Court found the principal issue
in Adams to be whether the need for private censorship outweighed the need for freedom of expression with respect to
public figures. 8 The Court found Adams to be a public fig13. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, at 342.
14. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 118, at 819.

15.
16.
17.
18.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 279-80.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra note 3, at 162.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
Adams, 8upra note 2, at 557.
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ure and summarily disposed of Adams' more tenuous contentions" in order to deal with the question of whether or
not failure to use a tape delay system constituted reckless
disregard for truth.
Adams contended that the failure to use a tape delay
system was negligent and wrongful, and that it constituted
an invitation for defamatory remarks, since there was no
way to control program content. Such conduct, Adams asserted, evidenced a reckless disregard for truth. The Court
declared that if reckless disregard was to be alleged, it was
Adams' burden to isolate factual material in the record which
would constitute proof that Frontier in fact entertained serious doubts with respect to truth of the publication.2 ° The
standard of malice with respect to both reckless disregard
and actual malice requires an opportunity on the part of the
publisher to evaluate the matter to be published and form
some conclusion as to its falsity or, at least, doubts as to its
truth.2 By not using a tape delay system Frontier deprived
itself of any opportunity to evaluate the information and
form a conclusion. Depriving oneself of opportunity to
investigate does not constitute reckless disregard. The Court
reasoned that under the circumstances of this case it was
impossible for Adams to factually establish the actual malice
required to show a violation of the constitutional standard
enunciated in New York Times.2 2
The Court held that summary judgment was the appropriate remedy because the time and expense of litigation itself
would have too great a "chilling effect" on public broadcasters. Further, the required use of a tape delay system on
radio talk programs would result in the "ultimate extinction"
of this kind of public forum.23 A temptation for self-censor19. Id. Given the broader constitutional standard involved, the Wyoming
Court dismissed Adams' contention that honesty or dishonesty was at issue.
Adams also contended that Frontier's failure to grant right of reply violated the "fairness doctrine" of Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C.,
395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court held that Adams did not bring that cause
of action in the proper court, and that it did not provide evidence of malice.
20. Adams, supra note 2, at 562.
21. St. Amant v. Thompson, supra note 17, at 731.
22. Adams, supra note 2, at 564-67.
23. Id. at 567.
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ship would be created that broadcasters would find difficult to resist. Ultimately, through use of a ten second tape
delay broadcast system, all comment from the public could
be slanted to conform to the broadcaster's opinion, resulting
in destruction of the uninhibited marketplace of ideas.2" The
Court condemned the "cowardice" 25 of the individual who
made the call, but, in order to safeguard the right to free
speech and preserve this forum of public debate, held the
price of Adams' remedy too great.
Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co.: A FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH STANDARDS

OF PROFESIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The Wyoming Court viewed Adams as presenting a
choice between "requiring private censorship" and "safeguarding the fundamental right of free speech." 6 The Court
thus foreclosed an opportunity to creatively shape a remedy
which could safeguard freedom of expression while establishing, at the same time, standards of responsibility for public broadcasters. The Court failed to fully consider society's
interest in preventing wrongful and unnecessary defamation
of public figures. The Constitution requires that some falsehood be protected in order to protect free expression. However, the need to avoid self-censorship is not the only societal
value at issue. 7 If it were, the Supreme Court would long
ago have embraced the view that publishers and broadcasters
enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from defamation liability."8 Intentional lies or careless errors do not
advance society's interest in public debate."9 A public forum
promoting intentional lies or careless errors likewise fails
to advance public debate. The holding of Adams encourages
an irresponsible public forum by failing to recommend reasonable standards of public broadcast responsibility. Members of the listening audience can call in on open mike programs and say anything about any public figure without fear
at 566-67.

24.

Id.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 567.
Id.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, at 341.
Id.
Id.
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of liability, and the broadcaster can freely act as a conduit
for defamatory falsehood.
The Wyoming Court analogized radio programs of this
sort to town meetings and reasoned that they are utilized in
a similar way to afford every citizen an opportunity to speak
his mind on any given issue." Similarities between the two
forums exist, but there is one very important difference.
True public debate took place in those early town meetings.
Citizens could not hide behind the shelter of a telephone receiver, but confronted each other face to face, with equal
opportunity to accuse and defend. Debate is a reasoned argument between persons of different opinions,"1 necessarily involving give and take. An open mike talk show does not provide a forum for debate when the individual being accused
or defamed is not even present on the program to reply.
Even though public figures may have greater access to means
of reply to defamatory falsehood, 2 there is substantial value
in being able to answer at the time the accusation is made.
Defamatory statements might do irreparable harm despite
the potential for answer, especially if that answer is given
days later to a different audience. The "chilling effect" on
public officials and figures33 might be substantial if public
broadcasting "pot shots" continue in this fashion.
The Wyoming Court's fear that censorship will run
rampant if the tape delay system is used seems unwarranted.
One of the reasons radio stations are in business is to make
money. The profitability of such shows should not be overlooked as open mike programs are of interest to the public
and, consequently, to sponsors. Radio stations would not
voluntarily ruin the profitability of this type of program by
destroying spontaneity. In Adams the Wyoming Court painted a picture of broadcasters sitting next to tape machines,
red-eyed, indiscriminately slashing comments and slanting
30.
31.
32.
33.

Adams, supra note 2, at 566.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 582 (1971).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, at 331.
The chilling effect might be twofold: first, public officials and figures
might be unwilling to participate on these programs to discuss topics of
public concern; secondly, individuals with sensitive areas of personal privacy might be unwilling to run for office or become a part of public
controversy.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss2/9

6

Bailey: Constitutional Law - Freedom of Expression and the Constitutional

1977

CASE NOTES

755

opinion until programs are but skeletons of public thought.
It is unlikely that this would result from using a ten second
tape delay system. Radio stations have an important interest in these programs and unwarranted censorship would
damage that interest. Furthermore, if stations have an interest in airing open mike programs, it would be reasonable
to assume that they, too, are committed to free speech and
would exercise any nominal censorship authority with extreme care, tipping the balance in favor of freedom of expression should difficult questions arise.
James Madison once said of the conflict between defamation and free speech:
Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good
with which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which
cannot be stripped from the stalk without wounding
vitally the plant from which it is torn. However
desirable those measures might be which might correct without enslaving the press, they have never
yet been devised in America.34
The conflict which troubled Madison and the fears held
by the Wyoming Court are not present in the circumstances of
Adams. The electronic tape delay system is a measure to
correct without enslaving the press. Failure to use tape
delay systems might not be reckless disregard for truth in
the strictest sense. However, a much higher regard for truth
and fairness would result should implementation of the device be required. There is potential for abuse or misuse, but
if reasonable standards are explicit, broadcasters could be
expected to use the tape delay system as a valuable tool to
enhance true public debate. Whether the solution is legislative or judicial, the Wyoming Court missed an excellent
opportunity to give needed direction in an area of law which
has been almost entirely shaped by judicial decrees. 5
CONCLUSION

The public broadcasting media has a position of extreme
importance in the dissemination of news and comment
34. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1790-1802 at 336 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
35. PROSSER, Supra note 6, § 118, at 819.
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throughout society. A high level of professional responsibility
should accompany the duty to disseminate news and comment.
In refusing to recognize the concomitant duty of the
broadcasting industry, the Wyoming Supreme Court may
have failed to preserve the integrity of that marketplace of
ideas that it sought to protect through its decision.
HENRY F. BAILEY

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss2/9

8

